



Haiti Experience



MINUSTAH Military Component (MC)
Operating in Port-au-Prince
2015-2016

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Agenda



1. Context - MINUSTAH Mandate 2004-17
2. Operating in Port-au-Prince (PaP):
 - Security Environment
 - PaP Complexities
 - Geography, Infra and Time and Space Challenges
 - Understanding own Forces Strength and Weaknesses
3. Final Considerations for third world country urban environment





MINUSTAH Mandate 2004-2017




1. President Aristide ousted Apr 2004
2. UNSCR 1542 MINUSTAH given vast mandate to support transitional gov and ensure secure and stable environment
3. Numerous UNSCRs in the following years
 - change in mandate and concept of operations to adjust to changing circumstances
 - Devastating earthquake in Jan 2010
 - Support to national elections in 2011 and 2017





Military Component (MC) Phases and Historical Evolution





Operating in Port-au-Prince (PaP)



- Despite national elections in 2011 and 2017, Haiti continued to face the consequences of political violence and instability all centered around PaP
- Most demonstrations linked to socioeconomic grievances
- Persistent deteriorating socioeconomic conditions hamper the process toward institutional normalization
- Security situation mostly a by-product of underlying conditions





Security Environment in PaP



– Security Situation

- Possible coup against government
- Localized incidents of political violence
- Isolated cases of vandalism and shootings against private companies' premises –unclear motivations
- Crimes against foreign nationals
- Attacks against Haitian security institutions



– Threat Environment

- Moderate/ low level of unrest
- Isolated outbursts of violence
- Street criminality a main concern
- Gang activity mostly focused in Cite Soleil and NCR






PaP City Complexities




1. Understanding the terrain and ecosystem (city purpose, functions, infra, environment, services, demo, etc)
2. Ability to operate in multiple complex terrain in one area of ops (high rise, slums, mountainous, flood zones)
3. Challenges to isolating objectives
4. Cultural awareness (dealing with national authorities and other security partners)





Geography, Infra and Time and Space Challenges



1. Limited maneuverability and forces – focused on protection of critical infrastructure
2. Requirement to pre-position and or hide movement
3. Deterrence by presence
4. Requirements for health considerations of your own troops





Understanding own Forces Strength and Weaknesses



UNPOL in PaP : 1020 / 2352 Total

- HQ + 4 x FPU
- 44 contributing nations

MC Forces in PaP: 1521 / 2370

Total

- TF HQ + BRA Bn + Eng + MP
+ HOSP + AVN
- 19 contributing nations

- **Concept of intervention : 1 (HNP local authorities) - 2 (UNPOL) - 3 (MC)**
- **MC operational reserve**
- **Limited technology (BRA Bn small drones introduced on trial)**
- **No night operations**
- **Varying degrees of forces proficiency: extremely poor to effective (BRA Bn trained in favelas)**
- **Limited effectiveness of AVN**
- **Lack of trust with HNP**





HNP Forces (Intervention 1-2-3)



UDMO: Unité départementale pour le maintien de l'ordre. (2)



CIMO: Corps d'intervention et de maintien de l'ordre. (Riot Police) (3)



Common HNP. (1)



GIPNH: Groupe d'intervention de la PNH. (SWAT) (3)



BOID: Brigade d'opération d'intervention départementale. (Special Operations) (3)





Final Considerations



1. Must gain full appreciation of all the complexities of your operating environment
2. Many challenges to controlling the battlespace in urban environment – how can to you mitigate the risks
3. Understand what your own forces strength and weaknesses, and those of your local security partners





Questions

